Abstract. Iterated hash functions based on block ciphers are treated. Five attacks on an iterated hash function and on its round function are formulated. The wisdom of strengthening such hash functions by constraining the last block of the message to be hashed is stressed. Schemes for constructing m-bit and 2m-bit hash round functions from m-bit block ciphers are studied. A principle is formalized for evaluating the strength of hash round functions, viz., that applying computationally simple in both directions invertible transformations to the input and output of a hash round function yields a new hash round function with the same security. By applying this principle, four attacks on three previously proposed 2m-bit hash round functions are formulated. Finally, three new hash round functions based on an m-bit block cipher with a 2m-bit key are proposed.
Introduction
This paper is intended to provide a rather rounded treatment of hash functions that are obtained by iterating a round function. Section 2 examines the possible attacks on such iterated hash functions, considers relations between the security of an iterated hash function and the security of its hash round function, and points out the wisdom of strengthening the hash function by constraining the last block of the message to be hashed.
In Section 3, we consider hash round functions constructed from secret-key block ciphers. In particular, we consider the problems of constructing m-bit hash round functions and 2m-bit hash round functions from m-bit block ciphers. A principle is formalized for evaluating the strength of hash round functions, viz., that applying computationally simple in both directions invertible transformations to the input and output of a hash round function yields a new hash round function with the same security. T o demonstrate this principle, we present four attacks on three previously proposed 2m-bit hash round functions. Finally, three new hash round functions based on an m-bit block cipher with a 2m-bit key are proposed.
2 Iterated hash functions and attacks
A hash function is an easily implementable mapping from the set of all binary sequences of some speci ed minimum length or greater to the set of binary sequences of some xed length. In cryptographic applications, hash functions are used within digital signature schemes and within schemes to provide data integrity e.g., to detect modi cation of a message.
An iterated hash function is a hash function Hash determined by an easily computable function h; from two binary sequences of respective lengths m and l to a binary sequence of length m in the manner that the message M = M 1 ; M 2 ; : : : ; M n , where M i is of length l, is hashed to the hash value H = H n of length m by computing recursively H i = hH i,1 ; M i i = 1 ; 2; ::n; 1 where H 0 is a speci ed initial value. W e will write H = H a s h H 0 ; M t o s h o w explicitly the dependence on H 0 . The function h will be called the hash round function. Such a recursive construction of hash functions has been called the meta-method" by Merkle 13 , see also 4, 15 . For message data whose total length in bits is not a multiple of l, one can apply deterministic padding" 7, 13 to the message to be hashed by 1 to increase the total length to a multiple of l.
For iterated hash functions, we distinguish the following ve attacks:
1. Target Remark. In applications where H 0 is speci ed and xed, attacks 2, 4 and 5 are not real attacks". This is because the initial value H 0 is then an integral part of the hash function so that a hash value computed from a di erent initial value will not be accepted. However, if the sender is free to choose and or to change H 0 , attacks 2, 4 and 5 can be real attacks, depending on the manner in which the hash function is used. Note that the free-start and semi-free-start attacks are never harder than the attacks where H 0 is speci ed in advance.
For an m-bit hash function, brute-force target attacks, in which one randomly chooses an M 0 until one hits the target" H = HashH 0 ; M ; require about 2 m computations of hash values. It follows from the usual birthday argument" that bruteforce collision attacks require about 2 m=2 computations of hash values. In particular, 2
for hash round functions with l m so that all 2 m hash values can be reached with one-block messages, brute-force target attacks require about 2 m computations of the round function h while brute-force collision attacks require about 2 m=2 computations of the round function h. We will say that the computational security of the hash function is ideal when there is no attack substantially better than brute force.
In the following discussion, we consider some relations between the security o f an iterated hash function and the strength of its hash round function. By an attack on the hash round function we mean an attack in which all the involved messages contain only one block. For example, a target attack on the round function h reads: given H 0 and M 1 The following attack using a xed-point" of the hash round function was proposed in 16 . Example 3 A trivial semi-free-start collision attack based on a` xed point'. If the hash round function h has a recognizable xed p oint", i.e., if one can somehow nd H;M such that H = hH;M, then there is a trivial semi-freestart collision attack since, starting with the initial value H 0 = H, the di erent" messages M = M and M 0 = M;M both hash to the same value H.
Note that in the trivial free-start and semi-free-start attacks and in the longmessage" attack described in the above three examples, one breaks the iterated hash function without breaking its round function. Such attacks are based on the fact that, for an iterated hash function of the form 1, the attacker can take advantage of the fact that a falsi ed message can have a length di erent from that of the given genuine message. This problem can be overcome by the following strengthening of iterated hash functions, which w as proposed independently by Merkle 13 a n d b y Damgaard 4 : Merkle-Damgaard Strengthening MD-strengthening For the iterated hash function, specify that the last block M n of the message" M = M 1 ; M 2 ; :::; M n to be hashed must represent t h e length of the true message" in bits, i.e., the length of the unpadded portion of the rst n , 1 blocks.
Using arguments similar to those in 4, 13, 17 , one can show that: Proposition 2 Against a free-start target or collision attack, an iterated hash function with MD-strengthening, Hash MD , has roughly the same computational security as its hash round function.
In the previous discussions we h a ve considered the security of an iterated hash function and the security of its round function against an attack of the same type. Now w e consider how to relate non-real" free-start target attacks to real" target attacks. The following result shows that, for an iterated hash function, when a random inverse" of the hash round function can be found with less than the ideal maximum of about 2 m computations, then there always exists a target attack on the hash function that is better than the brute-force target attack. The method used in the above proof of attacking an iterated hash function by working backward" 1, 22 has been used to attack several proposed iterated hash functions 15, 22 . The above result shows that if the hash round function does not have ideal computational security against a free-start target attack, then the iterated hash function cannot achieve ideal computational security against a target attack. Proposition 2, together with the argument used to prove Proposition 3, implies:
Proposition 4 Suppose that the unconstrained p ortion of messages must contain at least two blocks, i.e., n,1 2. Then an iterated hash function with MD-strengthening, Hash MD , has ideal computational security against a target attack if and only if its hash round function h; has ideal computational security against a free-start target attack.
Proof. Suppose the round function h has ideal computational security against a free-start target attack. Then Proposition 2 shows that Hash MD has the same ideal security against a free-start target attack. But a target attack without free start is no easier than a free-start target attack so that Hash MD also has ideal computational security against a target attack.
Conversely, i f f o r a n m-bit hash round function h, a free-start target attack takes less than 2 m computations, then Proposition 3 implies a target attack o n H a s h MD with less than 2 m computations.
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From the above t wo propositions, we see that MD-strengthening creates secure iterated hash functions from secure round functions. In particular, the trivial freestart and semi-free-start attacks and the long-message target attack in the above examples cannot be used to attack an iterated hash function with MD-strengthening. Such considerations suggest an obvious implementation principle for iterated hash functions, viz., that iterated hash functions should be used only with MD-strengthening. In the following discussion, whenever the security of an iterated hash function is considered, we always mean the security of the hash function with MD-strengthening.
Because of Proposition 4 and Proposition 2 and because one generally desires that the hash function be strong enough to provide protection against free-start attacks, the problem of constructing secure hash functions reduces to the problem of constructing hash round functions that are secure against free-start attacks, which will be considered in the next section.
Hash round functions based on block ciphers
In the following discussion, we consider schemes for constructing hash round functions from a block cipher. In what follows, we write Y = E Z X, for an m-bit block cipher E with k-bit key, to mean that the m-bit ciphertext Y is computed from the m-bit plaintext X and k-bit key Z. Based on the discussion in the last section, we consider only attacks on the hash round function or equivalently, attacks on the iterated hash function with MD-strengthening. The DM-scheme with MD-strengthening is generally considered to be secure in the sense that, if the block cipher has no known weakness, then no attack better than the brute-force attacks is known, i.e., the free-start target attack o n h takes about 2 m computations and the free-start collision attack o n h takes about 2 m=2 computations. In particular, with MD-strengthening, none of the attacks mentioned in the three examples of the last section can be e ectively used against an iterated hash function based on the DM-scheme. The DM-scheme is currently under consideration as an ISO standard 7 .
A proposed m-bit hash round function using a block cipher with m-bit block and 2m-bit key: This method is based on a block cipher with block-length m and key-length k = 2 m. and is illustrated in Fig. 2 . We h a ve been unable to nd an attack on this hash function better than the brute force attack when the underlying block cipher has no known weakness.
Construction of 2m-bit hash round functions
When the block length m of a block cipher is 64 which is the case for many practical block ciphers, one can obtain a 64-bit iterated hash function by using the DM-scheme. The brute-force" collision attack o n a n y 64-bit hash function has complexity about 2 32 , which is certainly too small in many applications. Thus, several e orts 2, 13, 14, 18, 20 have been made to construct a 2m-bit hash function based on an m-bit block cipher by modifying the apparently secure DM-scheme. This will be considered in the following sections.
A principle for evaluating hash round functions and four attacks on three 2m-bit hash round functions
In this section, we point out an obvious once the 5 attacks have been formulated but useful principle for evaluating the security of a hash round function, viz. thatapplying any simple in both directions invertible transformations to the input and to the output of the hash round function yields a new hash round function with the same security as the original one. A similar principle has been used by Meier and Sta elbach in 12 to classify nonlinearity criteria for cryptographic functions . For example, for a block cipher with block length equal to key length, it follows from this principle that the hash round function 2 of the DM-scheme has the same security as the following hash round function proposed in 11
since this hash round function di ers from that in 2 only by a s w apping" of the input blocks H i,1 and M i .
To demonstrate this principle, we present four meet-in-middle" attacks on three 2m-bit hash round functions based on an m-bit block cipher with an m-bit key. The basic purpose of these three schemes is to construct a 2m-bit hash function based on an m-bit block cipher by modifying the apparently secure DM-scheme 2. We now show that these 2m-bit hash round functions are in fact weaker than the m-bit hash round function of the DM-scheme. More precisely, for each s c heme, we present a free-start target attack that takes only about 2 m=2 instead of the ideal maximum 2 2m computations of the round function. Recall that the free-start target attack o n the m-bit hash round function in the DM-scheme has complexity 2 m .
The Preneel-Bosselaers-Govaerts-Vandewalle PBGV scheme.
The PBGV scheme was proposed in 18 . In this scheme, which uses an m-bit block cipher with an m-bit key, a 2 m-bit hash value H = H n ; G n is computed from a 2mn-bit message L 1 ; N 1 ; L 2 ; N 2 ; :::; L n ; N n and a 2m-bit initial value H 0 ; G 0 . In each round, two new m-bit values H i and G i are computed from the two previous m-bit values H i,1 and G i,1 and from the two m-bit message blocks L i and N i as follows: Because the transformations 5 and 6 are both easy to compute and easy to invert, it follows from our principle that an attack on the round function 7 has the same complexity a s a n a t t a c k on the round function 4.
A free-start target attack on the PBGV round function with complexity about 2 m=2 : In this attack, we show h o w to nd a random inverse" of 7, i.e., we The probability that some a and some a take on the same value is about 0.63. For such g 0 0 ; r ; a= a ; h 0 0 ; l 0 ; we obtain a solution h 0 0 ; g 0 0 ; l 0 ; n 0 for 7 by computing n 0 = al 0 h 0 0 l 0 h. A target attack on the PBGV round function with complexity about 2 m : In this attack, we nd, for the given h 0 ; g 0 and h; g, a message block l;n satisfying 4. We will use the notation of Fig.3 .
From 5 and 6, we see that h; f and h 0 0 are determined by the given h 0 ; g 0 and h; g. We After 2 m such computations, g 0 0 n 0 will take on the given value g 0 with probability 0.63. Then using 5 and 6, we obtain a solution l;n for 4. The QG-I scheme was proposed in the Abstracts from Eurocrypt'89 20 . It also appeared in a draft ISO standard 6 , see also 15 . However, this scheme was dropped from the recent v ersion of the draft ISO standard CD10118 7 . In unpublished work,
Coppersmith pointed out to its inventors some weakness of this scheme 21 . In the subsequent Proceedings paper 21 , a weaker" round function was used, but with additional functional strengthening. Similarly to the PBGV-scheme discussed above, the QG-I scheme is based on an m-bit block cipher with an m-bit key. A 2 m-bit hash value H n ; G n is computed from a 2mn-bit message L 1 ; N 1 ; L 2 ; N 2 ; :::; L n ; N n a n d a 2 m-bit initial value H 0 ; G 0 . In each round, two new m-bit values H i and G i are computed from the two previous m-bit values H i,1 and G i,1 and from the two m-bit message blocks L i and N i as follows:
for i = 1 ; 2; : : : ; n :
The round function of the QG-I scheme produces the output pair h; g from the input h 0 ; g 0 ; l ; n in the manner h = E l g 0 nnh 0 g 0 g = E n E l g 0 nnh 0 lh 0 g 0 l: 9 We will consider the pair h; f = h; hg illustrated in Fig.4 and de ned by h = E l g 0 nnh 0 g 0 f = hg = E n E l g 0 nnh 0 l E l g 0 nln: 
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A free-start target attack on the QG-I scheme with complexity about 2 m=2 : In the following we show that, for any given h; f, one can nd, in about 2 m=2 decrypting computations for the block cipher, a solution h 0 ; g 0 ; l ; n satisfying 10 by a meet-in-the-middle" attack.
We will use the notation shown in Fig.4 . Let c be a xed m-tuple. 1 . Randomly choose values for a and choose n such that an = c. Then, for the given value of f, compute h 0 0 = aD n af: Repeat this process 2 m=2 times to obtain 2 m=2 values for h 0 0 ; n with randomly chosen values for h 0 0 . 2. Randomly choose l and compute h 0 = hlcD l lc: In 2 m=2 computations, one obtains 2 m=2 values for h 0 ; l with randomly chosen values for h 0 . Note that both h 0 0 and h 0 are m-bit blocks so that some h 0 0 and some h 0 obtained as above will take on the same value with probability about 0.63. Thus, we can nd h 0 0 ; h 0 ; l ; n s u c h that h 0 0 = h 0 . Note that the constraint that lcln = a is automatically satis ed. From the obtained l;n, compute g 0 = D l lcn. Then the resulting h 0 ; g 0 ; l ; n is the desired solution. 2 3.3.3 The LOKI Double Block Hash DBH function.
The block cipher LOKI, proposed in 2 , is a DES-like 64-bit block cipher with a 64-bit key. I n 2 , a 128-bit iterated Double Block Hash DBH function based on the cipher LOKI was proposed, but this scheme can in fact be used for any m-bit block cipher with an m-bit key. In LOKI DBH, a 2m-bit hash value H n ; G n is computed from a 2 mn-bit message L 1 ; N 1 ; L 2 ; N 2 ; :::; L n ; N n a n d a 2 m-bit initial value H 0 ; G 0 . In each round, two new m-bit values H i and G i are computed from the two previous m-bit values H i,1 and G i,1 and from the two current m-bit message blocks L i and N i as follows:
for i = 1 ; 2; : : : ; n . The LOKI DBH round function was derived from the hash round function of the QG-I scheme 8 by the bitwise addition modulo 2 of the previous hash value blocks H i,1 and G i,1 to the current message blocks L i and N i to obtain the key inputs for the two LOKI encryptions. This was done to avoid some attacks derived from thè weak key' of the underlying cipher. By applying our security e v aluation principle, we obtain the following free-start target attack on the LOKI DBH round function that has complexity only about 2 m=2 .
The round function for the LOKI DBH produces the output pair h; g from the input h 0 ; g 0 ; l ; n in the manner h = E lg 0 g 0 nnh 0 g 0 g = E nh 0 E lg 0 g 0 nnh 0 l h 0 g 0 l: A free-start target attack on the LOKI DBH with complexity about 2 m=2 : In the following, we s h o w that, for any g i v en h; f, one can nd, in about 2 2 m=2 encrypting computations for the block cipher, a solution for h 0 ; g 0 ; l ; n satisfying 10 by a meet-in-the-middle" attack.
Because the transformations 13 and 14 are both easy to compute and easy to invert, it follows from our principle that nding a solution h 0 ; g 0 ; l ; n of 12 for a given h; g is computationally the same as nding a solution h 0 ; g 0 ; l 0 ; n 0 o f 1 5 f o r a given h; f. This can be done in about 2 2 m=2 encryptions as we n o w show.
1. Choose an arbitrary value for l 0 .
2. For the given h and the chosen l 0 , compute h 0 = hn 0 E l 0n 0 for 2 m=2 randomly chosen values of n 0 .
3. For the given h; f and the chosen l 0 , compute h 0 = E r hl 0 hl 0 f for 2 m=2 randomly chosen values of r = n h 0 g 0 .
The probability that some h 0 and some h 0 take o n t h e s a m e v alue is about 0.63. For h 0 = h 0 , b y computing g 0 = rn 0 h 0 , w e obtain a solution h 0 ; g 0 ; l 0 ; n 0 for 15. 2
Remark. We h a ve g i v en three free-start target attacks on three hash round functions in this section. The real" target attacks with speci ed initial value will usually be more di cult. For example, when m is 64 bits, a target attack on the 128-bit hash function LOKI DBH obtained by combining the above attack with the attack used in the proof of Theorem 3 will take about 2 128,32 2 = 2 80 computations. A similar conclusion holds also for the QG-I scheme hash function. 12 
Complexity o f k n o wn attacks on 2m-bit hash functions
We consider here some known 128-bit iterated hash functions based on two uses of an m = 64-bit block cipher with key-length k = 6 4 o r k = 5 6 i n e a c h round. All these schemes can be considered as slight modi cations of the 64-bit DM-scheme hash round function. The complexities of known attacks on these hash functions are listed in Table 1 . We assume that all the iterated hash functions are used with MDstrengthening and that the underlying block cipher has no known weakness such a s weak keys. The study of previously proposed hashing schemes see Table 1 suggests that it is di cult, if not impossible, to build a 2m-bit hash round function with ideal computational security that can digest" in each round at least m bits of message by t wo uses of an m-bit block cipher with an m-bit key. H o wever, if an m-bit block cipher with a 2 m-bit key is available, then there are more possibilities to construct a possibly secure 2m-bit hash round function. In the following, we propose two 2 m-bit hash round functions that use an m-bit block cipher with a 2m-bit key and that appear to be secure.
Tandem DM: We refer to our rst proposed 2m-bit hash function as the Tandem DM scheme because it is based on cascading two DM-schemes as in 2. The round function of the Tandem DM scheme is shown in Fig.6 . In each iteration, two new both of which h a ve the same inputs. Thus, to attack h in a free-start target or freestart collision attack implies that one must attack both h 1 and h 2 simultaneously. I f the subfunctions h 1 and h 2 are so`di erent' that an attack on one subfunction provides no help in attacking the other subfunction and if both h 1 and h 2 are equivalent in the sense of security to the apparently secure DM-scheme, then we can expect that an attack o n h will have complexity equal to the product of the complexities of the attacks on h 1 and on h 2 . In the proposed Tandem DM and Abreast DM schemes, the subfunctions h 1 and h 2 are chosen to be as di erent" as possible.
2. The Abreast DM scheme gives a 2m-bit hash function that is at least as strong as the m-bit DM-scheme. This is true also for the Meyer-Schilling scheme 7, 14 .
3. Our investigations to this point h a ve shown no weakness in either of these two new proposed 2m-bit hash round functions, i.e., we h a ve been unable to nd any attacks better than brute-force attacks when the underlying cipher is assumed to have no weakness. We should point out, however, that our Tandem DM and Abreast DM schemes use two m-bit block encryptions for each block o f m message bits in order to compute a nal hash value of length 2m bits.
